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NORM CONFLICT, FRAGMENTATION,  
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT  
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Samantha A. Miko* 
Abstract: In Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
Rights addressed the petition of a person detained by U.K. occupation 
forces in Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council authorization. 
One issue before the court in Al-Jedda—whether the petitioner’s rights 
against the U.K. government under the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms might disapply the Security 
Council authorization—illustrates the problem of norm conflict between 
intergovernmental regimes. The Al-Jedda court avoided directly pitting 
the differing norms at issue (Security Council resolutions versus Euro-
pean human rights treaty provisions), but in doing so left open such a 
conflict for where one such norm explicitly requires violation of the 
other. When this question arises, the court should not hold that the ap-
plicability of European treaty norms disapplies Security Council resolu-
tions or other United Nations acts, because so holding would further 
fragment the international system and leave states in positions where they 
will be bound to violate at least some of their international obligations. 
Introduction 
 On July 7, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
Grand Chamber ruled on the landmark case of Al-Jedda v. United King-
dom.1 This case dealt with the legality of the security internment of dual 
British-Iraqi citizen Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda in Iraq by British 
forces pursuant to a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution.2 
In Al-Jedda, the ECtHR meaningfully confronted the conflict of human 
rights norms guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) with those of secu-
 
* Samantha A. Miko is a Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. She would like to thank her parents, John and Halina Miko, for their 
tireless support and encouragement. 
1 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789, 789 (2011). 
2 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 794, 815–16. 
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rity.3 By holding that the rights to personal liberty and security en-
shrined in Article 5 of the ECHR were not displaced in this instance, 
the Grand Chamber for the first time confronted the norm conflicts it 
had previously avoided,4 and embarked down a path of interpretation 
that is both definitive and uncertain.5 On one hand, the Grand Cham-
ber’s decision is definitive because it reaffirms the constitutional nature 
of the ECHR6 and establishes a firm rule for interpreting Security 
Council resolutions that errs on the side of human rights protection 
and Security Council accountability.7 On the other hand, the Grand 
Chamber’s decision is also uncertain because such a move by the court 
will soon require the ECtHR to decide how much of a human rights 
restraint on the Security Council it intends to be, and what level of 
fragmentation in the international system it is willing to accept in order 
to assert such authority over its states parties.8 
 Part I of this Note provides a background on the facts of Al-Jedda 
and the circumstances of Al-Jedda’s detention, as well as the legal land-
scape in which British forces in Iraq were operating. Part II presents a 
discussion of norm conflict, fragmentation of the international system, 
and the particular difficulties in assessing norm conflicts regarding 
human rights. Part II further recounts the U.K. House of Lords deci-
sion in Al-Jedda as well as that of the ECtHR. Part II concludes with a 
discussion of the subsequent case Nada v. Switzerland, in which the 
ECtHR applied the Grand Chamber’s Al-Jedda reasoning. Part III ar-
gues that the ECtHR should value international legal cohesion and be 
reluctant to challenge the Security Council by asserting itself as an in-
dependent legal order, a move that could compromise the universality 
of the treaty’s protections by encouraging states parties to seek formal 
derogations. 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; Marko Milanović, Al-Skeini and Al-
Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 121, 136–37 (2012). 
4 See Marko Milanović & Tatjana Papić, As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of Human 
Rights’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law, 58 Int’l & Comp. 
L.Q. 267, 268, 293–95 (2009). 
5 See Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 845; Milanović, supra note 3, at 138; infra notes 6–7 
and accompanying text. 
6 See Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 842–43; Milanović, supra note 3, at 136. 
7 See Milanović, supra note 3, at 137–38. 
8 Cf. id. at 138 (noting that the ECtHR’s decision created an avenue for a meaningful 
human rights check on the Security Council and the court’s unease with the prospect of 
determining the relationship between the ECHR and the Security Council). 
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I. Background 
A. Occupation of Iraq and the Internment Regime 
 On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 1441 under its Chapter VII9 authority from the UN Charter.10 The 
Resolution asserted that, in failing to disarm and cooperate with the UN 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors, Iraq 
continued to be in material breach of its obligations under previous Se-
curity Council resolutions.11 Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a final opportu-
nity to disarm and cooperate fully with the inspectors or “face serious 
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”12 
 On March 20, 2003, the United States led a unified coalition of 
armed forces including the United Kingdom, Poland, Australia, and 
Denmark in the invasion of Iraq.13 By April 9, 2003, British forces over-
took the city of Baghdad, and by May 1, 2003, the coalition declared ma-
jor combat operations in Iraq complete, turning its efforts toward re-
construction.14 In early May 2003, the occupying states created the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to serve as an interim quasi-
governmental administrative body with legislative authority until the 
area became secure and it became possible to establish an Iraqi gov-
ernment.15 Coalition States appointed representatives to the CPA and 
divided Iraq into regional areas, with CPA South to be controlled by the 
United Kingdom and responsibility for the area to be vested in a U.K. 
Regional Coordinator.16 
 On May 22, 2003, the Security Council passed Resolution 1483.17 
Resolution 1483 authorized the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Spe-
cial Representative for Iraq to report regularly to the Security Council 
on activities in Iraq.18 
                                                                                                                      
9 See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42–43. Under Chapter VII, if the Security Council deter-
mines that there is “any threat to the peace” it may call upon member states either to im-
pose nonmilitary sanctions, like embargoes, under Article 41, or to take military action “as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” under Article 
42. Id. arts. 41–42; Henry J. Steiner, International Protection of Human Rights, in Interna-
tional Law 757, 762–63 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003). 
10 S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
11 Id. pmbl. 
12 Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. 
13 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 806. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 807–08. 
16 Id. 
17 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
18 Id. ¶ 8. 
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 The Governing Council of Iraq was established in July 2003.19 From 
this point forward, the occupying forces required the CPA to cooperate 
with the Governing Council on all matters relating to the temporary 
governance of Iraq.20 In October 2003, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1511 which authorized a multinational force that was em-
powered to “contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in 
Iraq.”21 
 On June 5, 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote to the 
President of the Security Council “to confirm that the MNF [Multi-
National Force] . . . is prepared to continue to contribute to the main-
tenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring ter-
rorism and protecting the territory of Iraq.”22 Powell stated that the 
MNF was prepared to pursue combat operations against “forces seeking 
to influence Iraq’s political future through violence” and to pursue “in-
ternment where . . . necessary for imperative reasons of security.”23 
 This letter was annexed to Resolution 1546 during its consideration 
by the Security Council, which adopted the measure on June 8, 2004.24 
With that Resolution, the Security Council supported the formation of a 
sovereign Interim Government of Iraq to assume responsibility by June 
30, 2004.25 The Security Council further required the Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI), to “promote the protection of human rights, national recon-
ciliation, and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of 
law in Iraq.”26 Finally, the Security Council 
[d]ecide[d] that the multinational force shall have the au-
thority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance 
with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing . . . the 
Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational 
force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and de-
terring terrorism, so that . . . the United Nations can fulfil its 
role in assisting the Iraqi people . . . and the Iraqi people can 
implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and 
                                                                                                                      
19 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 810. 
20 Id. 
21 S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
22 S.C. Res. 1546, annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 ( June 8, 2004). 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
25 Id. ¶ 1. 
26 Id. ¶ 7. 
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programme for the political process and benefit from recon-
struction and rehabilitation activities.27 
 On June 28, 2004, the Interim Government assumed control of 
Iraq, leading to the CPA’s disbanding.28 Thereafter, the MNF, including 
a large contingent from the United Kingdom, remained in Iraq pursu-
ant to Security Council authorization and the request of the Iraqi gov-
ernment.29 
 Resolution 1546 also required the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Council on the progress in Iraq.30 With regard to the in-
ternment regime, the Secretary-General stated in his report on June 7, 
2005: 
The volume of reports on human rights violations in Iraq justi-
fies serious concern. . . . One of the major human rights chal-
lenges remains the detention of thousands of persons without 
due process. According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 
approximately 10,000 detainees at the beginning of April, 
6,000 of whom were in the custody of the [MNF]. Despite the 
release of some detainees, their number continues to grow. 
Prolonged detention without access to lawyers and courts is 
prohibited under international law, including during states of 
emergency.31 
By the end of 2006, the Secretary-General’s estimation was that 13,571 
detainees were confined in MNF detention centers.32 UNAMI, which 
had been charged in Resolution 1546 with promoting the protection of 
human rights in Iraq,33 expressed similar reservations about the grow-
ing number of detainees.34 In its report from Fall 2005, UNAMI 
stressed the “urgent need to provide [a] remedy to lengthy internment 
for reasons of security without adequate judicial oversight.”35 Of the 
                                                                                                                      
27 Id. ¶ 10. 
28 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 816. 
29 Id. at 806, 816. 
30 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 22, ¶ 30. 
31 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolu-
tion 1546 (2004), ¶¶ 70, 72, U.N. Doc. S/2005/373 ( June 7, 2005). 
32 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolu-
tion 1546 (2004), ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. S/2006/945 (Dec. 5, 2006). 
33 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 22, ¶ 7. 
34 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 817–18. 
35 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report: 1 September–31 Oc-
tober 2005 para. 6 (2005), available at http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?file 
ticket=_FMe6vcxql4%3d&tabid=3174&language=en-US. 
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13,571 detainees in MNF detention centers, UNAMI reported in mid-
2006 that eighty-five were in U.K. custody, while the remaining 13,486 
individuals were in U.S. custody.36 
 When the MNF failed to reduce the number of security internees 
detained by late 2006, UNAMI’s January–March 2007 report expressed 
its concern: 
The practice of indefinite internment of detainees in the cus-
tody of the MNF remains an issue of concern to UNAMI. Of 
the total of 16,931 persons held at the end of February, an 
unknown number are classified as security internees, held for 
prolonged periods effectively without charge or trial. . . . The 
current legal arrangements at the detention facilities do not 
fulfill the requirement to grant detainees due process.37 
One such security internee was Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda.38 
B. The Detention of Al-Jedda 
 Al-Jedda was born in Iraq in 1957.39 He left Iraq in 1978, first for 
the United Arab Emirates and later Pakistan, after refusing to join the 
Ba’ath Party.40 In 1992, Al-Jedda travelled to the United Kingdom 
where he claimed asylum and was granted indefinite leave to remain, 
later becoming a British citizen in June 2000.41 In September 2004, “for 
family reasons”42 Al-Jedda and four of his children journeyed to Iraq, 
where they arrived on September 28, 2004.43 Acting on information 
provided by British intelligence services, U.S. soldiers arrested Al-Jedda 
at his sister’s home in Baghdad on October 10, 2004.44 Al-Jedda was 
taken to the British-run Sha’aibah Divisional Temporary Detention Fa-
cility in Basrah, where he was held in internment until December 30, 
                                                                                                                      
36 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report: 1 July–31 August 
2006 para. 58 (2006), available at http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket 
=gCQM_aC54jI%3d&tabid=3174&language=en-US. 
37 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report: 1 January–31 March 
2007 para. 71 (2007), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/jan-to-
march2007_engl.pdf. 
38 See Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 794. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Iraq Detainee Loses Court Appeal, BBC News (Mar. 29, 2006, 14:04 GMT), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4856406.stm (“Mr Jedda denies the allegations and has said his 
visit was for family reasons and nothing to do with terrorism.”). 
43 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 794. 
44 Id. 
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2007—a period of three years, two months, and twenty days in cus-
tody.45 
 The basis for Al-Jedda’s internment was that it “was necessary for 
imperative reasons of security in Iraq.”46 Though no criminal charges 
were brought against him, British authorities believed he had enabled 
the travel of an explosives expert into Iraq and conspired with him to 
attack coalition forces near Fallujah and Baghdad with improvised ex-
plosive devices.47 They also believed that Al-Jedda had conspired with 
members of an Islamist terrorist cell to smuggle high-tech detonation 
equipment into Iraq to achieve this purpose.48 Although the British 
Secretary of State for Defence noted that there was probably insuffi-
cient evidence to sustain a criminal charge in court, he nevertheless 
signed an order depriving Al-Jedda of his U.K. citizenship because it 
was “conducive to the public good.”49 
 Upon his December 30, 2007, release, Al-Jedda travelled to Turkey 
where he appealed against the deprivation of his British citizenship.50 
This appeal was dismissed on April 7, 2009, by the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission, which “was satisfied on the balance of probabili-
ties . . . that [Al-Jedda] had facilitated the travel to Iraq of a terrorist 
explosives expert and conspired with him to smuggle explosives into 
Iraq and to conduct improvised explosives device attacks against coali-
tion forces around Fallujah and Baghdad.”51 
 In early 2005, Al-Jedda began proceedings in the British High 
Court challenging the legality of his detention under the Human Rights 
Act and requesting transfer to the United Kingdom.52 Al-Jedda claimed 
that his detention was unlawful because it violated ECHR Article 5, 
which says that, absent a formal derogation, “[e]veryone has the right to 
liberty and security of person” and that “[n]o one shall be deprived of 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id.; see Alex Barker, UK Army Accused of Letting Iraq Killers Go, Fin. Times (Feb. 15, 2008, 
12:28 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1adfdd02-db3a-11dc-9fdd-0000779fd2ac.html (“[Al-
Jedda] claim[ed] that British military officers agreed on a schedule to release all detainees in 
return for a pledge by the militia to cease attacks on British forces.”). 
46 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 794. 
47 Id. at 794–95. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 795; Michael Wood, Detention During International Military Operations: Article 
103 of the UN Charter and the Al-Jedda Case, 47 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 139, 149 (2008). 
50 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 795–96. 
51 Id.; Al-Jedda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Appeal No. SC/66/2008, para. 17 
(Spec. Immigr. App. Comm’n Apr. 7, 2009) (U.K.). 
52 Francesco Messineo, The House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: Attri-
bution of Conduct to Un-Authorized Forces and the Power of the Security Council to Displace Human 
Rights, 56 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 35, 36 (2009). 
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his liberty” except in limited enumerated cases and “in accordance with 
a procedure prescribed by law.”53 In short, Al-Jedda argued that the 
ECHR does not allow for such preventative security detention.54 
 The U.K. government countered that, pursuant to Article 103 of 
the UN Charter, the authorization of security internments in Resolu-
tion 1546 prevailed over any provision of the ECHR.55 Al-Jedda’s case 
was heard by the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal, and the House 
of Lords.56 Each dismissed his claim.57 
C. Al-Jedda Before the House of Lords 
 The House of Lords—the highest appellate court in the United 
Kingdom at the time—decided the Al-Jedda case on December 12, 
2007.58 The primary issue before the court was whether, by virtue of the 
U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998,59 Al-Jedda’s detention was unlawful 
under the ECHR, or whether the human rights guarantees of that 
treaty were qualified or displaced by Resolution 1546 by virtue of UN 
Charter Article 103.60 Article 103 provides that “[i]n the event of a con-
                                                                                                                      
53 ECHR, supra note 3, art. 5(1); Messineo, supra note 52, at 36. 
54 Wood, supra note 49, at 153 (“It was common ground [between the parties] that the 
detention was not in conformity with article 5(1) if that provision applied, since it clearly 
fell within none of the exceptions listed therein.”). 
55 Marko Milanović, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 Duke 
J. Comp. & Int’l L. 69, 81 (2009). 
56 Messineo, supra note 52, at 36; see R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State 
for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 (appeal taken from Eng.); R (on the applica-
tion of Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 327 (Eng.); R (on the appli-
cation of Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2005] EWHC (Admin) 1809 (Eng.). 
57 See R (on the application of Al-Jedda), [2007] UKHL 58 at [155]; R (on the application of 
Al-Jedda), [2006] EWCA (Civ) 327 at [110], [113]–[114]; R (on the application of Al-Jedda), 
[2005] EWHC (Admin) 1809 at [154]; Messineo, supra note 52, at 36. 
58 See R (on the application of Al-Jedda), [2007] UKHL 58 at [155]. Al-Jedda also argued 
before the House of Lords that the conduct of British forces toward him was attributable 
to the United Kingdom or to the UN as a result of Resolution 1511. See id. at [149]; Wood, 
supra note 49, at 140. If the acts of soldiers in the MNF ceased to be attributable to their 
home nations and were instead attributable to the UN, the United Kingdom would not be 
liable before the ECtHR for the soldiers’ acts. See Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 837. On this 
issue, Lord Bingham, speaking for the majority, held that the actions of U.K. troops in 
interning Al-Jedda were not attributable to the UN. See R (on the application of Al-Jedda), 
[2007] UKHL 58 at [24]–[25]. This ruling was predictably affirmed by the ECtHR on ap-
peal, with the court noting that it “[did] not consider that, as a result of the authorisation 
contained in Resolution 1511, the acts of soldiers within the Multi-National Force . . . 
ceased to be attributable to the troop-contributing nations.” Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 
837. 
59 Milanović, supra note 55, at 80 (explaining that ECHR rights were accepted into 
English law by the Human Rights Act 1998). 
60 Id. at 81; Wood, supra note 49, at 140, 153. 
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flict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations un-
der the present Charter and their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.”61 The prevalence of a state’s “obligations under the Charter” 
extends to binding Security Council resolutions, a fact established by 
the International Court of Justice and by the practice of states.62 
 The government conceded “that [Al-Jedda’s] detention was not in 
conformity with Article 5(1) [ECHR] if that provision applied, since it 
clearly fell within none of the exceptions listed therein.”63 As to the 
treaty’s applicability, Al-Jedda argued “that the Security Council resolu-
tion placed no obligation on the United Kingdom, but only authorized 
his detention, with the consequence . . . that Article 103 had no appli-
cation.”64 Lord Bingham, writing for the majority, disagreed with this 
argument, pointing to the robust and persuasive scholarship which 
supports the idea that Article 103 is equally “applicable where conduct 
is authorised by the Security Council as where it is required.”65 This 
scholarship explains that Security Council resolution authorizations 
have largely replaced the Charter’s collective security regime as origi-
nally envisioned.66 
 Lord Bingham emphasized that “the reference in article 103 to 
‘any other international agreement’ leaves no room for any excepted 
category,” including responsibilities under human rights instruments.67 
His Lordship summarized the House of Lords’ holding, in which it 
ruled that 
the UK may lawfully, where it is necessary for imperative rea-
sons of security, exercise the power to detain authorised by 
[Resolution] 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure 
that the detainee’s rights under article 5 are not infringed to 
any greater extent than is inherent in such detention.68 
                                                                                                                      
61 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
62 Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising 
from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measure, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 
¶¶ 39–40 (Apr. 14); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th sess, 
May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, ¶ 331, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006). 
63 Wood, supra note 49, at 153. 
64 Id. 
65 R (on the application of Al-Jedda), [2007] UKHL 58 at [33]. 
66 See, e.g., Milanović, supra note 55, at 78. 
67 R (on the application of Al-Jedda), [2007] UKHL 58 at [35]. 
68 Id. at [39]. 
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Baroness Hale concurred, articulating the concern latent in Lord 
Bingham’s discussion.69 She noted that in such situations “[t]he right 
[to liberty and security of person] is qualified but not displaced. . . . 
The right is qualified only to the extent required or authorized by the 
resolution. What remains of it thereafter must be observed.”70 
 After his claim was dismissed by the House of Lords, Al-Jedda ap-
pealed to the ECtHR.71 
II. Discussion 
A. Norm Conflict Generally 
 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom presents a problem of norm conflict: 
human rights (obliged by the ECHR) versus security (authorized by 
Resolution 1546).72 Norms are legally binding rules establishing distinct 
rights and responsibilities between subjects of international law.73 Con-
flict between two norms exists “if one norm constitutes, has led to, or 
may lead to, a breach of the other.”74 Such conflict can be handled ei-
ther by avoidance or resolution.75 Instances in which the two norms are 
at first glance contradictory, but where the conflict can be avoided by 
interpretive means, are called apparent conflicts.76 Courts usually re-
spond to the “powerful tendency in international law toward harmoni-
zation and systemic integration that abhors conflicts and seeks to avoid 
them.”77 In cases where no interpretative techniques of conflict avoid-
ance satisfy the court, a genuine, as opposed to an apparent, norm con-
flict results.78 
 If a state enters into an agreement that genuinely conflicts with 
some previous agreement to which it is a party, but which does not ab-
rogate the original treaty, the state will incur the legal cost of being 
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. at [126]. 
70 Id. 
71 See Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 805. 
72 See Milanović, supra note 3, at 138. 
73 Milanović, supra note 55, at 72. 
74 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law 175–76 
(2003); see also Erich Vranes, The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal 
Theory, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 395, 401–07 (2006) (discussing narrower and broader defini-
tions of norm conflict). 
75 Marko Milanović, A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship Between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 14 J. Conflict & Security L. 459, 465 (2010). 
76 Id. 
77 Milanović, supra note 55, at 73. 
78 Pauwelyn, supra note 74, at 272. 
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held responsible to both.79 In other words, “though this second treaty 
might be contrary to the provisions of an earlier one, and thus ‘illegal,’ 
it is not thereby invalidated and still has legally binding force as the 
product of valid state consent.”80 
 Though unavoidable, these conflicts might still be resolvable.81 
Rather than interpreting away incompatibility, resolution requires one 
of the conflicting norms to trump the other.82 Furthermore, resolution 
only occurs “if the state bears no legal cost for disregarding one of its 
commitments in favor of another.”83 This would be true if, for example, 
under the UN Charter’s prospective conflict clause (Article 103), a 
treaty were to conflict with an obligation under the Charter.84 Prospec-
tive conflict clauses are provisions inserted into treaties which preemp-
tively establish whether that instrument will take priority over an-
other.85 Article 103 is “the only truly meaningful” such provision for at 
least two reasons.86 
                                                                                                                     
 First, it does not follow from the Article 103 declaration that Char-
ter obligations prevail over all others that the conflicting norm is in-
validated, as it would be if it conflicted with a jus cogens norm.87 The 
conflicting norm continues to exist, but the state is not permitted to 
follow it.88 Second, Article 103 absolves the member state of any fault 
for breaching the conflicting norm.89 A member state cannot therefore 
be impugned for failing in its obligations under the conflicting norm.90 
 Although Article 103 is not technically a rule of hierarchy like the 
peremptory status of a jus cogens norm, it has in practice elevated the 
status of the UN Charter when conflicting with other treaties.91 Taken 
 
79 Milanović, supra note 55, at 76. 
80 Id. 
81 Milanović, supra note 75, at 465. 
82 Id. 
83 Milanović, supra note 55, at 73–74. 
84 Id. at 76. 
85 Milanović, supra note 75, at 467. 
86 Milanović, supra note 55, at 76. 
87 Id.; see, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 311 (stating a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international 
law). For a more in-depth discussion of jus cogens and norm conflict, see Rep. of the Int’l 
Law Comm’n, supra note 62, ¶¶ 361–373. 
88 Milanović, supra note 55, at 76. For an explanation of relevant international law on 
the primacy of Article 103 and UN Security Council resolutions, see Wood, supra note 49, 
at 146–47. For a more detailed discussion of fragmentation and Article 103 conflicts, see 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 62, ¶¶ 333–334. 
89 Milanović, supra note 55, at 77. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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in tandem with the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, Article 103 
empowers the Security Council to legally bind states with its decisions.92 
Article 103 provides the mechanism that allows States to participate in 
Chapter VII operations authorized by the Security Council despite con-
flicting obligations under regional human rights agreements.93 
 Analyzing norm conflicts between human rights and security in 
the international system is very different than resolving similar conflicts 
within domestic legal structures.94 Whereas domestic legal systems like 
the United States’ are, in general, centralized and hierarchical in the 
way they address norm conflicts, the international legal system lacks the 
key features that enable domestic legal systems to resolve genuine 
norm conflicts95— “a centralized system with a developed hierarchy, 
and at that a hierarchy based on the sources of norms.”96 For instance, 
in domestic systems, constitutional norms usually prevail over statutory 
norms.97 In international law, the only real instances of hierarchy are 
the few jus cogens norms—for example, the prohibition of genocide.98 
While jus cogens norms void any conflicting treaty obligation, resolving 
the conflict, they are “used rarely, if ever, to invalidate supposedly con-
flicting norms.”99 
 Furthermore, domestic legal systems are centralized in that there 
are preset rules regarding the supremacy of norms passed by different 
legislators (as in federal systems).100 Conversely, actors in the interna-
tional system are sovereign “equals who . . . exercis[e] their powers 
through multiple, heterogeneous law-making processes, during which 
they rarely take into account the possibility of conflict with other norms 
or legal regimes.”101 As a result, not only are many of the conflict resolu-
tion techniques useful in domestic legal systems unavailable to interna-
tional courts hearing cases involving norm conflict, but also the “plural 
legislators” of the decentralized international legal system frequently 
                                                                                                                      
92 Wood, supra note 49, at 146. 
93 Id. 
94 See Pauwelyn, supra note 74, at 94–95; Milanović, supra note 55, at 74. 
95 Pauwelyn, supra note 74, at 94–95; Milanović, supra note 55, at 74. 
96 Milanović, supra note 55, at 74; see also Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative 
Normativity,’ in International Law 145, 146–47 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003). 
97 Milanović, supra note 55, at 74. 
98 Id. (“Though a treaty will usually prevail over custom, this is so only because the cus-
tomary rule is jus dispositivum, meaning that it can be contracted out of, and applies only 
by default if the parties in question have not agreed differently.”). 
99 Id. at 71; see infra text accompanying notes 141–148 (discussing why elevating a cer-
tain norm to jus cogens status is rarely used to invalidate a conflicting norm). 
100 Milanović, supra note 55, at 74. 
101 Id. at 75. 
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enter into contradictory agreements.102 This results in an international 
system wherein it is entirely plausible—even likely—that norm conflicts, 
both unavoidable and unresolvable, may present themselves to interna-
tional courts.103 
B. Fragmentation in International Law 
 The increasing likelihood of norm conflict is a feature and conse-
quence of the problematic phenomenon of fragmentation in interna-
tional law.104 Fragmentation is one aspect of the trend in modernity 
toward “increasing specialization of parts of society and the related 
autonomization of those parts,” or what sociologists call functional dif-
ferentiation.105 In other words, though globalization has greatly ho-
mogenized some aspects of social life, it has also caused greater frag-
mentation through the proliferation of specialized and independent 
areas of social activity and organization.106 
 This global social fragmentation has been reflected in the interna-
tional legal arena through the development of specialized and relatively 
independent regimes, institutions, and practice areas.107 General inter-
national law, which once governed most issues, has been edged out, 
especially since the end of the Cold War,108 by such specialist systems as 
trade law, human rights law, and environmental law, each of which ap-
plies its own principles and institutions.109 Unfortunately, the creation 
of legal rules in these specialized spheres of practice tends to transpire 
with little cognizance of the legislative and institutional activities of 
other spheres or of the principles and practice of general international 
law.110 
                                                                                                                      
102 Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 849, 854–55 (2004); Milanović, supra note 55, at 75. 
103 See Milanović, supra note 55, at 75; see also Hafner, supra note 102, at 854–55 (ex-
plaining the causes of norm conflict, such as why incompatible legal obligations tend to 
arise in the international system and why the system lacks rules to resolve those conflicting 
norms). 
104 See Milanović, supra note 55, at 69. But see generally Mario Prost & Paul Kingsley Clark, 
Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of 
International Organizations Really Matter?, 5 Chinese J. Int’l L. 341 (2006) (challenging the 
presumption that the proliferation of international organizations and concurrent fragmenta-
tion of the international system alone weaken the coherence of international law). 
105 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 62, ¶ 7. 
106 Id.; Hafner, supra note 102, at 850. 
107 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 62, ¶ 8. 
108 Hafner, supra note 102, at 849. 
109 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 62, ¶ 8. 
110 Id. 
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 This trend is especially disconcerting in that some specialist sys-
tems, particularly regional ones whose multilateral founding agree-
ments contain human rights elements, have begun to declare them-
selves independent legal orders or self-contained regimes, separate 
from the legal order of the United Nations.111 For example, in Kadi v. 
Council, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that European Un-
ion (EU) member states’ obligations to uphold EU human rights guar-
antees could not be superseded by Security Council resolutions, despite 
UN Charter Article 103, because EU law constitutes an “internal” and 
“autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an interna-
tional agreement.”112 
 In so holding, the ECJ called into question “the most fundamental 
operating assumption of Article 103.”113 “Like any rule of hierarchy (or 
something closely resembling one), [Article 103] can only prevail over a 
norm which is part of the same legal order.”114 The constitution of one na-
tion is the supreme law only in that domestic legal system, but not in the 
legal orders of other countries.115 In the same way, Article 103 is “supe-
rior law only in the international legal system.”116 According to the Kadi 
holding, however, “the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions, 
just like any other piece of international law, exist on a separate plane 
and cannot call into question or affect the nature, meaning, or primacy 
of fundamental principles of [EU] law.”117 In short, a Security Council 
                                                                                                                      
111 See, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca, The International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 Harv. Int’l 
L.J. 1, 23–24, 49 (2010) (showing that, in Kadi, the ECJ recognized that the European 
Community is independent from the UN and recognized superiority of the Community’s 
human rights rules over the UN Charter). 
112 Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, paras. 4, 282, 
285, 316–317. Kadi, which was an extremely complex case, dealt with the anti-terrorist 
sanctions enacted by the Security Council in Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions 
made to target the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Al-Qaida network. See Milanović, supra 
note 55, at 87. These resolutions established a subsidiary body (the Sanctions Committee) 
tasked with maintaining lists of suspected terrorists against whom UN member states were 
obliged to enforce sanctions. Id. The EU member states decided to implement these sanc-
tions through the EU, rather than through their domestic legal systems by adopting several 
common positions and regulations through the EU Council, which included a list of sus-
pected terrorists from the Sanctions Committee whose assets were to be frozen. Id. Kadi’s 
assets were frozen, an act he complained violated his fundamental rights under EU law, 
“including the right to a fair hearing, the right to property and the right to judicial re-
view.” Id. 
113 Milanović, supra note 55, at 88. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 de Búrca, supra note 111, at 24. 
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resolution could not displace Kadi’s fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the EU because “it could not penetrate this independent legal order.”118 
 The concern about fragmentation in international law is not a new 
one; the international system has always lacked a centralized legislative 
body.119 Furthermore, deviations in the ways states parties to treaties 
agree to deal with various problems are to be expected as the result of 
differing policy preferences.120 After all, “[i]n conditions of social com-
plexity, it is pointless to insist on formal unity.”121 Fragmentation, then, 
is in many respects merely indicative of the accelerated spread of inter-
national legal activity into new areas, each of which might necessitate a 
different approach.122 In this respect, fragmentation could be a positive 
phenomenon, encouraging states to comply with international norms 
that better capture the state’s preferences because they are regional in 
nature.123 Nevertheless, “sociologically speaking, present fragmentation 
contains many new features, and its intensity differs from analogous 
phenomena in the past.”124 
 Importantly, the splintering of the international legal system into 
“‘self-contained regimes’ and geographically or functionally limited 
treaty-systems” produces numerous negative effects, namely: conflicting 
norms, diverging institutional practices, and the erosion of a coherent 
perspective on international law.125 When new and independent legal 
orders are established that deviate from the current understanding of 
international law, the unity of the international legal regime suffers126 
because of serious concerns about forum-shopping, overlapping juris-
diction, conflicting jurisprudence, and the loss of legal security.127 These 
overlaps and conflicts threaten the legitimacy of international law by 
making international law unreliable and unpredictable.128 
                                                                                                                      
118 Milanović, supra note 55, at 88. 
119 Hafner, supra note 102, at 850; see C. Wilfried Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Trea-
ties, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 401, 403 (1953). 
120 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 62, ¶ 16. 
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122 See id. ¶ 14. 
123 See Hafner, supra note 102, at 850–51, 859–60. 
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127 Id. ¶ 9; Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Post-
modern Anxieties, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 553, 554–55 (2002). 
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C. Fragmentation and Human Rights 
 The fragmentation phenomenon is particularly problematic in the 
context of norm conflicts involving human rights.129 When appearing 
before tribunals such as the ECtHR, human rights advocates argue that 
“because of the community interest and values that human rights 
norms enshrine, norm conflict situations involving human rights are 
. . . of constitutional importance, even though human rights norms are per 
se not hierarchically superior to other norms of international law.”130 
By arguing that human rights norms are “of constitutional impor-
tance,” human rights lawyers are appealing to the meaning of “constitu-
tional” as describing “law that recognizes no source of superior law, that 
does not draw validity and legitimacy from any other legal order.”131 
 The ECtHR, for example, also views its founding multilateral 
agreement as “constitutional” in nature.132 It has notably described its 
founding treaty as the “constitutional instrument of European public 
order.”133 In doing so, however, the court arguably draws upon a differ-
ent meaning of the term “constitutional.”134 That is, one “used to em-
phasize the importance of a document [here, the ECHR] that embod-
ies the fundamental values of a community” —in this case, the Council 
of Europe.135 
 If courts were to adopt human rights lawyers’ “constitutional” per-
spective on their founding instruments, a fairly logical (though auda-
cious) next step would be for courts to reason that those instruments 
are foundational to a legal order separate and distinct from that of 
other spheres of international law.136 By extension, courts would be 
                                                                                                                      
129 See Milanović, supra note 55, at 70. 
130 Id. (emphasis added). 
131 See id. at 70, 126, 130. 
132 See, e.g., Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, para. 156 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 
2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69564; Behrami v. 
France, App. No. 71412/01, para. 145 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (admissibility decision), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80830. 
133 Behrami, App. No. 71412/01, para. 145. 
134 See Milanović, supra note 55, at 130. 
135 See id. One can infer that the ECtHR meant the “community” definition of constitu-
tional because in the same opinion (Behrami ) that it asserts the ECHR as “the constitu-
tional instrument of European public order,” the court also asserts that the ECHR must be 
interpreted in light of the UN Charter. See Behrami, App. No. 71412/01, paras. 145, 147. If 
the court at that time considered itself constitutional in the “no higher law” sense, than it 
would not have felt compelled to interpret its obligations in light of the UN Charter—
weighing the competing considerations of the conflict in Kosovo—and would have de-
cided Behrami differently. See id. 
136 See Milanović, supra note 55, at 70, 126, 130. 
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forced to conclude that states parties’ obligations under these founding 
instruments are impervious to dismissal by conflicting treaty obligations 
drawn from other international spheres.137 
 As a result, public international lawyers claim that human rights 
“are one of the principal culprits of fragmentation” in the international 
legal landscape.138 From the perspective of those advocating a general 
approach to international law, “the human rights lawyer’s misguided 
belief that wishful thinking is a law-making process . . . lead[s] him to 
assert that the special nature of human rights somehow warrants devia-
tions from general international law.”139 Some scholars perceive this 
demand for special status and solutions as disconcerting because it pre-
cipitates greater fragmentation and “disrupts the systemic quality of 
general international law.”140 
 Given that several jus cogens norms are human rights norms, one 
might wonder why, when conflict arises involving human rights norms 
(as embodied, say, in the ECHR), courts and states do not simply articu-
late a jus cogens argument in favor of that human rights norm, thereby 
trumping the conflicting norm.141 In practice, jus cogens is nearly always 
advanced merely “as a rhetorical device or as a ‘weapon of deterrence.’”142 
 This is because, fundamentally, “jus cogens is a blunt instrument.”143 
Were a human rights norm elevated to jus cogens status, the result would 
be the invalidation of the conflicting norm.144 If the conflicting norm is 
embodied in a treaty, the entire instrument would be invalidated regard-
less of the conflicting norm’s relative importance within that treaty.145 
Furthermore, as soon as it is accepted that the human rights norm is jus 
cogens, there can be no balancing of interests against the conflicting 
norm, no consideration of competing values or consequences.146 It 
should be noted, for example, in the context of Al-Jedda, that “the pro-
hibition of preventative detention certainly does not qualify as jus cogens, 
if for no other fact than that internment is expressly allowed in armed 
                                                                                                                      
137 See id. 
138 Id. at 70. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 70–72. 
142 Milanović, supra note 55, at 71. 
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note 96, at 150–59. 
144 Milanović, supra note 55, at 72 n.14. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. 
1368 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
conflict.”147 Given these facts, human rights advocates continue to in-
voke the spirit of jus cogens—that human rights norms ought to be hier-
archically superior—but instead, as the applicants did in Al-Jedda, cham-
pion human rights treaties as constitutional instruments of independent 
legal spheres wherein Security Council resolutions have no bearing.148 
 Cases like Al-Jedda, which force the ECtHR—tasked with upholding 
a crucial human rights instrument—to confront the conflict between 
human rights norms and norms contained in instruments allowing, for 
example, preventative detention for the purpose of maintaining secu-
rity are becoming more frequent and politically important.149 With tar-
geted sanctions against terrorists having become more common in re-
cent years, such cases have worked their way through domestic legal 
systems and are now reaching the ECtHR’s docket, placing the court at 
a crossroads where it needs to determine whether it administers an in-
dependent legal order separate from that of the United Nations.150 
D. Al-Jedda in the ECtHR: Context for the Ruling and Its Implications 
 Some authors have characterized the distinctive features of UN 
Charter Article 103 as a “confirmation of the constitutional character of 
the Charter as the founding instrument of the post-Second World War 
international legal order.”151 As noted above, the UN Charter is not the 
only document so perceived—the ECtHR also envisions the ECHR to 
be constitutional in nature.152 For the ECtHR, the Convention is the 
“‘constitutional instrument of European public order,’ of which the 
Court itself is the ultimate guardian.”153 
 Until recently, the ECtHR was able to evade ruling on norm con-
flicts between the “founding instrument of . . . international legal or-
der”154 and the “constitutional instrument of European public or-
der.”155 But a policy of ignoring norm conflict has become increasingly 
                                                                                                                      
147 Id. at 93. 
148 See id. at 70–71. 
149 See id. at 69. 
150 See Milanović, supra note 55, at 69, 131. 
151 Id. at 77. See generally Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of 
the International Community, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 529 (1998) (describing the UN 
Charter as the founding document of the international legal order in the post-Second 
World War era). 
152 See Behrami, App. No. 71412/01, para. 145; supra text accompanying notes 132–135. 
153 Milanović, supra note 55, at 86; see also Behrami, App. No. 71412/01, para. 145. 
154 Milanović, supra note 55, at 77. 
155 Milanović & Papić, supra note 4, at 289, 293. 
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difficult for the court to maintain.156 For example, in the widely criti-
cized157 case of Behrami v. France, the court struggled with the tension 
between the ECHR and the crucial role of the UN’s peace and security 
functions expressed in the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority.158 
The court observed the importance of maintaining harmony between 
the ECtHR’s case law and general international law, saying the ECHR 
“has to be interpreted in the light of any relevant rules and principles 
of international law” —in particular, UN Charter Article 103.159 The 
court further noted that although ensuring respect for human rights is 
a purpose of the UN represented in the Charter’s preamble, the Secu-
rity Council is tasked with fulfilling the organization’s primary objective 
under Chapter VII: maintaining international peace and security.160 
This having been said, the court was reluctant “to openly defy the [Se-
curity] Council or interfere with the Chapter VII system and peace-
keeping operations such as Kosovo.”161 The court sidestepped ruling 
on norm conflict, instead concocting an untenable test that attributed 
the impugned conduct to the UN, rather than to the contracting 
tuted an “autonomous legal system which [was] not to be prejudiced by 
                                                                                                                     
states.162 
 After Behrami, the wave of litigation produced by Security Council 
resolutions that targeted sanctions against suspected terrorists made it 
clear that dodging norm conflict would soon become impossible for 
the ECtHR.163 Most influential in this respect was the ECJ ruling in 
Kadi, discussed above, that the EU’s human rights guarantees could not 
be superseded by Security Council resolutions because EU law consti-
 
156 See id. at 293 (describing the great interpretative lengths the ECtHR went to in Beh-
rami to avoid ruling on norm conflict). 
157 See Messineo, supra note 52, at 39–43 (recounting Behrami’s faults); Milanović & 
Papić, supra note 4, at 289, 293. 
158 See Behrami, App. No. 71412/01, paras. 145, 147; Milanović, supra note 55, at 86, 
126, 129; Wood, supra note 49, at 145. The joined cases of Behrami and Saramati (com-
monly referred to simply as Behrami) dealt with the actions of UN peacekeepers under 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command, which resulted in the deaths of 
several children by cluster-bombing, whose survivors alleged violation of ECHR Article 2 
(right to life) and the security detention of a man in Kosovo, allegedly in violation of 
ECHR Article 5. Milanović & Papić, supra note 4, at 269. Those forces were in Kosovo pur-
suant to Security Council Resolution 1244. Id. In Behrami, the ECtHR ruled that the actions 
of peacekeepers in Kosovo were attributable neither to NATO, nor to any of the member 
states that contributed troops, but only to the UN. Id. at 267. 
159 Behrami, App. No 71412/01, paras. 147–148. 
160 Id. paras. 148–149. 
161 Milanović, supra note 55, at 86. 
162 Id. at 85–86; Milanović & Papić, supra note 4, at 294–95. 
163 See Milanović, supra note 3, at 134; Milanović, supra note 55, at 69. 
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an international agreement.”164 With such persuasive authority in his 
pocket, Al-Jedda arrived in Strasbourg and asked the ECtHR to follow 
in the ECJ’s footsteps.165 
 On appeal to the ECtHR, Al-Jedda’s arguments underscored the 
ECtHR’s own opinion of the ECHR as the “constitutional instrument of 
European public order.”166 Because the ECtHR discussion of norm con-
flict in its case law was minimal at best, Al-Jedda urged the court to rely 
on Kadi’s persuasive authority, arguing that the ECtHR creates “a self-
contained regime” overridden only by an official derogation of a state 
party167 and not by a matter of norm conflict.168 Al-Jedda again con-
tended that Resolution 1546 was a mere authorization rather than an 
obligation of member states under the UN Charter, and that Article 103 
was therefore inapplicable.169 He further argued that even if Article 103 
did apply, the Security Council could not simply wipe away the ECHR 
                                                                                                                      
164 Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, para. 316. 
165 See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789, 843 (2011). 
166 Milanović, supra note 3, at 136; see Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 843. 
167 The ECHR derogation procedure is laid out in Article 15, which reads: 
 (1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its ob-
ligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigen-
cies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law. 
 (2) No derogation from Article 2 [the right to life], except in respect of 
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3 [the prohibition on 
torture], 4 (paragraph 1) [prohibition on slavery] and 7 [no one held guilty 
of an ex post facto law] shall be made under this provision. 
 (3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation 
shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of 
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the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have 
ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully 
executed. 
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 15. 
168 See Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 843. 
169 Id. In arguing that Resolution 1546 was a mere authorization rather than an obliga-
tion required of UN member states, Al-Jedda was not referring to the debate regarding the 
operative language employed in Security Council resolutions (i.e., the resolution stating 
that it “authorizes” certain measures, not that it “obliges” member states to take those 
measures). See id. at 842. Rather, Al-Jedda pointed out that Resolution 1546 made security 
internment only one of many types of security measures MNF states were authorized to 
use. Id. The language of the Resolution, as Al-Jedda characterized it, “did not require a 
state to take action incompatible with its human-rights obligations, but instead left a dis-
cretion to the state as to whether, when and how to contribute to the maintenance of secu-
rity.” Id. 
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seemingly as an afterthought.170 By so arguing, Al-Jedda effectively asked 
the court to divide the ECHR’s legal order from the UN system.171 
 On the issue of apparent norm conflict, the court began its assess-
ment from the starting point of “the purposes for which the United Na-
tions was created” as embodied in UN Charter Article 1.172 Noting first 
the well-accepted and crucial purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security, Article 1’s third subparagraph also “provides that the 
United Nations was established to ‘achieve international cooperation in 
. . . promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms.’”173 Keeping these dual purposes in mind, the court 
reasoned that Article 24(2) compels “the Security Council, in discharg-
ing its duties with respect to its primary responsibility. . . . to ‘act in ac-
cordance with [all of] the Purposes and Principles of the United Na-
tions.’”174 From this line of reasoning the court delivered a clear rule: 
                                                                                                                      
170 See id. at 843. It should be noted that Al-Jedda advanced an alternative argument, 
that the court should “rely on its own decision in Bosphorus and say that . . . resolutions 
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 The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment 
of these common ends. 
U.N. Charter art. 1. 
173 Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 845. 
174 Id. 
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[I]n interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption 
that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obli-
gation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of 
human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a 
Security Council Resolution, the Court must therefore choose 
the interpretation which is most in harmony with the re-
quirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict 
of obligations. In the light of the United Nations’ important role in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be ex-
pected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security 
Council to intend States to take particular measures which would con-
flict with their obligations under international human rights law.175 
 The court then stated several reasons why, in its assessment, the 
terms of Resolution 1546 failed to clearly show the Security Council’s 
intent to obligate ECHR states parties to employ indefinite summary 
internment in breach of their Convention obligations.176 The court 
found particularly persuasive the fact that although internment was 
(per Secretary of State Powell’s letter) given as an example of the 
“broad range of tasks” the MNF was prepared to assume, “the termi-
nology of the Resolution appears to leave the choice of the means to 
achieve this end” to the MNF.177 Finally, the court found it “difficult to 
reconcile the argument that Resolution 1546 placed an obligation on 
Member States to use internment with the objections repeatedly made 
by the United Nations Secretary and [UNAMI] to the use of intern-
ment by the [MNF].”178 Given these findings, the court held: 
In the absence of a clear provision to the contrary, the pre-
sumption must be that the Security Council intended States 
with the [MNF] to contribute towards the maintenance of 
peace and security in Iraq while complying with their obliga-
tions under international human rights law [and therefore in 
the U.K.’s case, the ECHR].179 
 In so ruling, the court addressed the norm conflict using a tech-
nique of avoidance that made several interpretative presumptions, most 
fundamentally: “a presumption that the Security Council does not in-
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tend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach . . . human 
rights.”180 The court then assumed that, given the prominent status of 
human rights protection as one of the UN’s roles, it was fair to presume 
further “that clear and explicit language would be used were the Secu-
rity Council to intend States to take particular measures which would 
conflict with their obligations under international human rights law.”181 
For the factual reasons noted above, the court held that the language 
of the authorization in Resolution 1546 was not explicit, or at least not 
unambiguously so, and the United Kingdom’s obligation to guarantee 
Al-Jedda’s rights under the ECHR stood.182 
E. Nada v. Switzerland: The Al-Jedda Presumption Tested 
 The Al-Jedda holding created the presumption that the Security 
Council does not intend to authorize behavior not compliant with hu-
man rights treaties.183 Where the court remained markedly silent, how-
ever, was on the crucial issue of whether a resolution could prevail over 
the ECHR if it did rebut the presumption with such explicit language.184 
The ECtHR sidestepped this question in Al-Jedda.185 It deftly maneu-
vered to do so again in the subsequent case of Nada v. Switzerland.186 
 Nada concerned Italian and Egyptian national Youssef Moustafa 
Nada, a resident of the Italian enclave Campione d’Italia in the Swiss 
Canton of Ticino.187 Under Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1333, 
and 1390, the Swiss Federal Council adopted measures to target the 
suspected associates of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida, whose names 
were on a list maintained by the Security Council’s Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee.188 The measures froze the assets of listed persons (as in the 
Kadi case) and also restricted their entry into or travel through Switzer-
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land.189 This list included Nada, whose name was added on November 
9, 2011.190 Nada requested his name be deleted from the list, but this 
request and subsequent appeals were denied.191 Nada claimed that this 
left him confined as if under house arrest to Campione d’Italia, pre-
venting him from seeking medical treatment, visiting his relatives, or 
worshipping at a mosque because exiting the enclave in any direction 
would require him to pass through Switzerland.192 Nada further 
claimed that the addition of his name to the Sanctions Committee’s list 
had the effect of publicly alleging his association with Al-Qaida, an as-
sociation that impugned his reputation and that he fervently denied.193 
Before the ECtHR, Nada argued that he had been deprived of several 
rights under the ECHR, including (1) the right to liberty and security 
under Article 5, (2) the right to respect for private and family life, 
honor, and reputation under Article 8, and (3) the right to an effective 
remedy for those harms under Article 13.194 
 The ECtHR Grand Chamber considered international legal frag-
mentation in its assessment of Nada’s Article 8 claim.195 It acknowl-
edged that Switzerland’s obligations under Article 8 were in apparent 
conflict with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions, but 
reiterated that diverging commitments between the ECHR and other 
obligations of states parties should “be harmonized as far as possi-
ble.”196 The court next confirmed the reasoning of Al-Jedda, but distin-
guished it because Resolution 1390 “expressly required” Switzerland to 
infringe on Nada’s Article 8 freedoms.197 Because of this “clear and ex-
plicit language, imposing an obligation to take measures capable of 
breaching human rights,” the court found the Al-Jedda presumption 
had been rebutted.198 
 Nonetheless, rather than next holding either that the authority of 
the resolutions prevailed under UN Charter Article 103 or that the 
ECHR is a separate legal order wherein Article 103 does not apply, the 
court avoided the question altogether.199 It found—to the considerable 
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disagreement of the concurring judges200—that “Switzerland enjoyed 
some latitude, which was admittedly limited but nevertheless real, in 
implementing the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.”201 
Because of this, the court reasoned that Switzerland had “failed to show 
that [it] attempted, as far as possible, to harmonise the obligations that 
[it] regarded as divergent.”202 In other words, the government could 
have done more, even within the confines of its Resolution 1390 obliga-
tions, to minimize the intrusions on Nada’s human rights.203 
 Such a fact, the ECtHR found, “dispense[d] the Court from de-
termining the question . . . of the hierarchy between the obligations of 
the States Parties to the Convention under that instrument, on the one 
hand, and those arising from the United Nations Charter, on the 
other.”204 The norm conflict between the ECHR and the resolution was 
avoidable, in the court’s opinion, through harmonious interpretation, 
leaving no reason to involve Article 103 as a means for resolving the 
conflict.205 
III. Analysis 
 In Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR finally acknowledged the 
problem of norm conflict between the ECHR and Article 103.206 But in 
Nada v. Switzerland, though given the opportunity, the court failed to 
rule conclusively on whether Security Council resolutions could, by vir-
tue of Article 103, displace the ECHR.207 In spite of the progress 
brought by Al-Jedda, the question therefore remains: when again con-
fronted with a conflict between the ECHR and explicit language from 
the Security Council, will the ECtHR admit that Article 103 trumps the 
ECHR or will it declare itself part of a separate legal order wherein Ar-
ticle 103 has no bearing?208 
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 When the court inevitably hears such a case again, it will be 
tempted by fragmentationist impulses209 to assert the ECHR as a sepa-
rate legal order wherein Article 103 cannot displace the ECHR even if a 
Security Council resolution explicitly purports to do so.210 Such an as-
sertion would be detrimental to the coherence of international law and 
to the human rights project of the ECHR.211 Instead, the court should 
maintain its Al-Jedda presumption that where the Security Council in-
tends to authorize behavior not compliant with human rights treaties it 
will do so explicitly, but acknowledge that where the Council does un-
ambiguously authorize, the ECHR is necessarily displaced by Article 
103.212 
A. The Interpretative Presumptions of Al-Jedda Alone Are Significant 
 The interpretative presumptions established in Al-Jedda are ex-
tremely meaningful in and of themselves, and their implications will be 
felt by human rights advocates, the Security Council, and ECHR states 
parties alike.213 In fact, these are precisely the interpretative presump-
tions for which some scholars in the field have long advocated.214 The 
result of Al-Jedda will be the tacit promotion of Security Council ac-
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countability.215 Hence, “[i]f the Council now truly wishes to release 
states from their human rights obligations, it will have to do so through 
clear and unambiguous language . . . and its members will have to take 
political responsibility for their actions.”216 
 With the Al-Jedda ruling, the court has responded to human rights 
advocates’ disparagement of the lack of Security Council accountability 
in the human rights context.217 Advocates have continually expressed 
frustration at the relative ease with which the fifteen states of the Secu-
rity Council— “an organ which, no matter how important its mission, is 
not accountable to anyone” —may whisk away “the constitutional in-
strument of European public order.”218 For example, although the lan-
guage of Resolution 1546 was admittedly more specific, resolutions rou-
tinely use language such as “all necessary measures” and “all necessary 
means.”219 As human rights advocates have noted, “[i]t is one thing to 
say that the phrase ‘all necessary means’ has in practice developed as 
the appropriate diplomatic euphemism for the use of military force, 
but it cannot be plausibly read as an absolution from all human rights 
constraints that do not qualify as jus cogens.”220 Furthermore, it has al-
ways been fundamentally disconcerting “that in order to avoid liability 
for human rights abuses by their forces, member states might rely on 
the UN, a body designed to preserve peace, law and human rights.”221 
 From the perspective of human rights advocates, then, the Al-Jedda 
presumption is laudable in that it will help provide a long-awaited check 
on the Security Council’s ability to override human rights protections.222 
This is because ECHR states parties engaging in missions authorized by 
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the Security Council will desire predictability.223 Until Al-Jedda, ECHR 
states parties could feel confident that they would not be expected to 
adhere to the ECHR’s guarantees when acting pursuant to Security 
Council authorization.224 Given the holding of Al-Jedda, such states will 
be uncomfortable engaging in military operations abroad under am-
biguous authorizations, fearing that they, like the United Kingdom, may 
be called to task by the ECtHR for behavior implicitly within the scope 
of their authorization.225 Being so concerned, such states may exert po-
litical pressure on Security Council members to be explicit in the lan-
guage of their resolutions in order to prevent involved ECHR states par-
ties from being held accountable for non-ECHR-compliant behavior.226 
If the Security Council were to refuse to be so explicit, the result may be 
“a chilling effect on the willingness of states to participate in interna-
tional military operations, and on what they are prepared to allow their 
armed forces to do when they do participate.”227 
 Admittedly, the use of explicit and unambiguous language is a rar-
ity in the Security Council’s history.228 Furthermore, as Judge Poale-
lungi observed in his partially dissenting opinion in Al-Jedda, even if the 
Security Council had the will to use such explicit language, it might be 
“unrealistic to expect the Security Council to spell out in advance, in 
detail, every measure which a military force might be required to use to 
contribute to peace and security under its mandate.”229 
 Nevertheless, given the reproach the Security Council’s broad dis-
cretion has drawn in recent years, it makes sense that if the Security 
Council intends to authorize states to derogate from applicable human 
rights instruments, it must do so in a way that, at the very least, makes 
explicit the Council’s intent and exposes its members to the political 
consequences of that decision.230 Thus, “[i]f the Council truly intends 
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to derogate from human rights, that intent must be manifested in the 
language of the resolution, and the reasons for doing so should be ex-
plained openly, not left to backroom dealings between diplomats.”231 By 
such explicit action, the Security Council “may [even] come out stronger 
through gaining more legitimacy from accountability. After all, the stan-
dards and values enforced by [regional courts] are also those pursued by 
the international legal order.”232 In these ways, the Al-Jedda presump-
tions may “prove to be a key tool for securing human rights compliance 
with respect to [Security Council] decisions.”233 
B. Further Fragmentation of the International System Is Undesirable 
 The implications of the ECtHR asserting itself as part of a separate 
legal order would be extreme from both an academic and a practical 
perspective.234 As Katja Ziegler pointed out in her discussion of Kadi v. 
Council, by “asserting the ‘constitutional dimension’ of the [European 
Community], the ECJ inevitably add[ed] another layer and, possibly, 
centrifugal force into the legal landscape at the international level, 
hence contributing to the fragmentation of international law.”235 Simi-
larly, asserting the ECHR as a self-contained regime would further frag-
ment the international system, exacerbating the negative effects of that 
phenomenon on the coherence and authority of international law.236 
Those negative effects include further proliferation of conflicting 
norms, diverging institutional practices, and the erosion of a coherent 
perspective on international law.237 
 Concern with these negative effects stems not only from the im-
mediate consequences of an ECtHR holding, but also from the “cen-
trifugal force” such a holding would lend to the fragmentation phe-
nomenon across the international system.238 The judgment of such an 
influential regional court is “likely to be given significant attention by 
courts in other countries and jurisdictions, and even by political actors 
within these and other jurisdictions, which are facing similar questions” 
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regarding Security Council authority.239 A fragmentationist approach 
by the ECtHR would potentially encourage other states and regional or 
specialist systems “to assert the primacy of their autochthonous values 
over the common goals of the international community.”240 Other 
states and systems would be particularly receptive to such implicit sup-
port were this message to be sent by the ECtHR, the judicial human 
rights branch of the geographically inclusive and “juridically influen-
tial” Council of Europe.241 
 The ECtHR is an important actor in the international arena dur-
ing a period when the openness of constitutional systems to the inter-
national legal order will impact not only the studies of academics, but 
also the lives of individuals.242 It is not desirable for the ECtHR to en-
courage insular attitudes in other legal systems.243 As Gráinne de Búrca 
has remarked: 
The degree of openness of domestic legal systems to interna-
tional law is a significant factor in shaping the context in which 
the foreign policy decisions of those systems are made. And 
the degree of openness and engagement on the part of inter-
national organizations with international and transnational law 
and institutions is an important factor in shaping both the le-
gal environment in which norms are generated by that organi-
zation and the substance of the norms generated.244 
Apprehension toward an assertion of the ECtHR as part of a separate 
legal order then, is the same as that expressed by de Búrca and other 
scholars regarding Kadi.245 Namely, that a persuasive fragmentationist 
holding will embolden other courts “to assert their local understand-
ings of human rights and their particular constitutional priorities over 
international norms and over Chapter VII resolutions of the Security 
Council.”246 
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C. An Undesirable Dilemma for ECHR States Parties 
 The assertion of the ECHR as a self-contained regime would un-
doubtedly give rise to conflicting obligations for states parties between 
the ECHR and UN Charter Article 103.247 Although the ECJ’s ruling in 
Kadi has been met with limited success in promoting Security Council 
accountability,248 these results might equally stem from the standard set 
by Al-Jedda.249 Also, the risks associated with putting ECHR states parties 
in such a predicament make the separate-regime option undesirable 
for practical reasons.250 Pitting ECHR and UN obligations against each 
other would be potentially detrimental to both organizations.251 
 For the UN, such fragmentation could undermine collective secu-
rity by shaking ECHR states parties’ willingness to participate in armed 
conflicts under Security Council authorization where derogation from 
the ECHR seems impossible.252 This is especially likely given that an-
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other recent ECtHR decision—Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom253—has si-
multaneously expanded the class of persons over whom states parties 
could exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially.254 In other words, the pool 
of potential plaintiffs to whom states parties could be held accountable 
for human rights violations has suddenly swelled.255 States parties will 
necessarily be wary of engaging in behavior authorized by the Security 
Council that is incongruent with the ECHR.256 
 For the ECHR, it is uncertain whether its obligations would prevail 
in the estimations of its states parties.257 Most likely, using fragmenta-
tion as a drastic tool by which the ECtHR might hope to pressure states 
parties to radically reform the Security Council’s accountability would 
have the opposite effect: ECHR states parties would increasingly seek 
formal derogations when confronted with a conflicting resolution 
within the Security Council’s sanctions regime.258 The result would 
likely be incommensurate with the ECHR’s aspirations as state parties 
attempt to stretch the category of circumstances that fit the require-
ments for derogations to include their resolution-authorized behavior, 
resulting in a new wave of litigation on the issue appealable to the 
ECtHR.259 
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note 211, at 268 (noting that, were Article 103 to absolve states parties of all ECHR respon-
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Conclusion 
 It is difficult to predict whether the ECtHR will assert itself as part 
of a separate legal order. Undoubtedly, the ECJ’s Kadi v. Council deci-
sion looms large in the minds of the ECtHR judges tasked with uphold-
ing the “constitutional instrument of European public order.” The an-
swer likely depends on how effective a human rights check on the 
Security Council the presumptions from Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom ac-
tually turn out to be and, consequently, how serious a threat the ECtHR 
views the Security Council to be to human rights protection going for-
ward. This Note proposes, however, that the judges should value the 
importance of international legal cohesion and be reluctant in the end 
to challenge the Security Council and risk compromising the universal-
ity of the treaty’s protections by encouraging states parties to seek for-
mal derogations. 
 
sibilities, states would not feel the need to take advantage of the formal derogation proce-
dures of the ECHR). 
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